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 
Abstract — The release of automated vehicles is only possible 
if their safety is ensured. Thus, acceptable safety requirements 
for all stakeholders have to be defined. The scope of this work is 
a traceable proposal of a definition of macroscopic safety 
requirements for highly automated driving in urban 
environments. 
Firstly, relevant stakeholders are identified. These are the 
society in general, the users of automated vehicles and other road 
users, which are further divided into subgroups, depending on 
their type of traffic involvement. Secondly, the available 
statistical data for Germany is analyzed. Hereby the domestic 
annual mileage is identified as the most suitable parameter to 
relate the stakeholder-specific accident numbers to. The 
quotients of accidents of different stakeholders and the driven 
distance represent the current risks of manual driving in urban 
environments, which are used as exemplary safety reference. 
Thereafter, existing risk acceptance principles from other 
domains such as the railway industry are used to determine the 
acceptable risks for each stakeholder group, which can be 
directly used as macroscopic safety requirements. 
Among other analytics, it is shown that the users of automated 
vehicles are attributed to the highest risk tolerance, while other 
road users are the most critical stakeholder group in terms of 
safety requirements.  
 




One of the major challenges for the release of highly 
automated vehicles (HAV, Level 3 and higher according to 
[1]) is their safety approval.  The major question “How safe is 
safe enough?” has not yet been answered in detail. In this 
context, the term "safe enough" refers to a situation in which 
the risk emanating from a product is lower than the marginal 
risk that is still tolerated by society and legislative. It seems 
evident that safety requirements are no less relevant in 
requirements engineering than purely functional requirements. 
Furthermore, a strict separation of the two types of 
requirements is not always possible. For example, the correct 
functioning of the steering system of motor vehicles is a 
prerequisite for the avoidance of damage events whose 
severity may contribute to exceeding the tolerated risk. 
 
The research leading to these results is partly funded by the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) within the 
project “VVM - Verification & Validation Methods for Automated Vehicles 
Level 4 and 5”.  
In order to take account of the functional safety of road 
vehicles, ISO 26262 [2] provides guidelines in the form of 
(safety) processes to be carried out or methods to be applied, 
which serve to avoid the corresponding risks. In connection 
with the question of whether a new technology has reached the 
required maturity for its market launch, the application of 
methods such as those proposed in ISO 26262 forms a 
necessary basis for argumentation and decision-making. 
However, following the standard is not sufficient to answer 
this question. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, ISO 
26262 refers to functional safety, which is only a subset of the 
overall system safety. Secondly, the standard focuses on 
electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems. Consequently, 
hazards such as chemical reactions, fire or electric shock are 
not part of the scope of ISO 26262, unless they are due to 
malfunction of E/E systems. [3, pp. 11-12] In addition, 
methods proposed by the standard - for example the "Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis" (FMEA) - only offer the 
possibility of their application if the system to be analyzed has 
already been specified to a sufficiently high level of detail. 
This is the case, for example, if the system and its elements 
can be represented as a function block diagram. [4, pp. 6-7] 
However, in order to define safety requirements for automated 
driving in general, there is no functional structure of a tangible 
system and the feasibility of analysis methods such as FMEA 
is not given.  
For these reasons, a macroscopic approach is chosen, 
which does not aim to define safety requirements for a specific 
system, its assemblies or even its individual components. Nor 
does it address special driving or hazardous situations in road 
traffic. Rather, the focus is on the quantitative requirements 
such as a maximum number of fatal accidents per inhabitant, 
per time interval or per distance travelled. These are referred 
to as so-called macroscopic safety requirements. [5] 
A definition of macroscopic safety requirements for 
automated driving on motorways has already been carried out 
by Junietz et al. [5] The aim and scientific contribution of this 
work is to transfer the considerations made with regard to 
motorway driving to the inner-city traffic situation, i.e. to 
define macroscopic safety requirements for automated driving 
within urban environments. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
A. Risk Acceptance Principles 
Macroscopic safety requirements such as a maximum 
number of accidents per travelled kilometer are risk indicators. 
[5] Risk is generally defined as the product of the two factors: 
predicted amount of damage and frequency of occurrence of a 
damage event. [6, p. 187] Therefore, whether a quantifiable 
risk is below or above a tolerable limit, depends just on these 
two parameters. This fact is also evident from the risk graph 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:Risk graph based on Steininger et al. [7] 
The green area at the bottom left of Figure 1 marks the 
range of accepted risks. If the risk emanating from a technical 
system is found there, the system is considered safe. In 
contrast, the red area in the upper right-hand corner marks the 
area of unaccepted risks and thus signals the uncertainty of the 
system. The border between accepted and unaccepted risks or 
between safe and unsafe systems is not exactly defined. 
Instead, there is a blurred transition area denoted in yellow. [5] 
In order to be able to formulate and quantify clear safety 
requirements for systems or technologies despite this 
diffusion, various risk acceptance principles or risk acceptance 
criteria have been developed. They originate from railway 
applications, explained in EN 50126, and have been 
transferred to road traffic within the scope of research. [5, 8]  
The following sections are discussing the three principles for 
the definition of accepted (limit) risks. 
1) As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
The risk of being struck by lightning is about 10-7 per 
person per year. Risks emanating from activities, technologies 
or events below this threshold are generally considered 
negligible and therefore acceptable. In contrast, the risk of fatal 
injury in a road traffic accident is higher. In Germany and other 
industrialized countries, it is in the order of 10-4 per person per 
year. In most cases higher risks are only accepted for voluntary 
exposures, such as in the case of extreme sports. In the 
transition zone between 10-7 and 10-4, general statements on 
risk acceptance are not possible without further analysis. 
Rather, cost-benefit analyses are to be carried out within this 
range in order to quantify the risk that is still feasible in a 
specific application - taking into account technical, economic 
and social aspects. This means that a specific risk must be kept 
as low as reasonably practicable. [5] [8, pp. 58-59] 
Quantitative cost-benefit analyses of road safety 
technology are only possible if the subject of discussion is a 
tangible system with defined elements, such as assemblies or 
components and quantifiable values or costs. However, this 
work does not aim at a specific automated vehicle but 
addresses automated driving independently of specific 
realizations. Cost-benefit analyses are therefore - at least in the 
narrower sense - not feasible. Accordingly, a risk acceptance 
principle requires higher levels of abstraction. This leads to the 
two principles "Minimum Endogenous Mortality" (MEM) and 
"Globalement au moins aussi bon" (GAMAB), which are 
explained in the following sections. 
2) Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM) 
Minimum endogenous mortality is based on age-specific 
mortality rates. Although the absolute values of these rates are 
not constant for all ages, there is a distinct minimum of 5∙10-5 
deaths per person per year for the group of 5-15 year old 
children. It should be noted that the corresponding standards, 
still partly anticipated mortality rates from the 1980s. In the 
case of EN 50126 and similar standards, the assumption is 
made that an individual person is exposed to multiple (normed 
to 20) systems at the same time. According to MEM, the 
maximum risk, MEM/20, therefore calculates to 2∙10-4 deaths 
per person per year. Irrespective of which numerical value is 
regarded as decisive for a risk acceptance study, the MEM 
principle requires that the additional risks arising from a new 
technical system does not exceed the respective MEM/20 
value or tolerable risks derived from it. Using MEM is 
particularly predestined for its use as criteria for risk 
acceptance analysis when a completely new technology is 
introduced that does not intend to replace an existing system. 
[8, p. 58] [9] 
3) Globalement au moins aussi bon (GAMAB) 
GAMAB is a risk acceptance criterion frequently used 
especially in France. The term GAMAB is derived from the 
French expression "Globalement au moins aussi bon", which 
translates as "at least as good in general". Based on the 
designation it is already clear that GAMAB requires the 
existence of a reference system. The principle implies the 
assumption that the risks posed by the already existing system 
are generally accepted. These risks define the current safety 
level and thus, at the same time the minimum safety 
requirement for a new system which means that the new 
system must not pose higher risks than the existing system. [7, 
p. 58] 
4) Correlation and suitability of risk acceptance principles 
Figure 2 visualizes the risk acceptance principles along 
with their respective marginal risks. For the quantitative 
classification of GAMAB, the current risk of fatal accidents on 
German motorways was used as a reference. The other risk 
acceptance principles and their respective limit values are 
valid independently of technical reference systems and / or 
locations. The graph also shows that the level of a still 
  
tolerated risk depends not least on whether the risk exposure is 
voluntary, occupationally, involuntary or due to large-scale 
technologies. While the willingness to accept risks is virtually 
unlimited if the exposure is voluntary - for example within the 
framework of leisure activities - the tolerance limit is much 
lower in the case of large-scale technologies such as nuclear 
energy. It corresponds approximately to the lower limit of the 
ALARP principle, which is defined by the risk of succumbing 
to a lightning strike. Remaining (borderline) risks can be found 
between these two extremes. [5] 
 
Figure 2: Risk acceptance principles and respective marginal risks 
[5] 
The fact that the feasibility of cost-benefit analyses as part 
of the ALARP principle is not given in the context of 
automated driving in general has been explained above. 
Furthermore, knowing that a reference system exists in the 
form of the current traffic situation motivates the application 
of GAMAB rather than MEM for automated driving. In this 
context, the German Ethics Committee "Automatisiertes und 
vernetztes Fahren", appointed by the Federal Ministry of 
Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI), demands the 
following: "The approval of automated systems is only 
justifiable if they promise at least a reduction of damage in the 
sense of a positive risk balance compared to human driving 
performance". [10] However, the requirement of a positive 
risk balance, i.e “at least as good” as a human driver is quite 
vague. So far it is not clear, how much better an automated 
driving function has to be compared to its reference. For 
example, Junietz et al. [5] state that a Highway-Chauffeur has 
to be better by a factor of 1.3, while Liu et al. conclude, that 
this factor is between 4 and 5 [11]. Furthermore, if a technical 
solution is existing, that is significantly better than the current 
reference, it has to be taken as new reference. 
Taking this into account, the use of a risk acceptance 
principle based on a reference system seems not only 
appropriate but also mandatory even if the required 
improvement factor is not known. Another argument for the 
use of GAMAB is that MEM - as described above - is based 
on mortality rates. Thus, while this principle is predestined as 
a risk acceptance criterion for accidents involving fatalities, it 
is only of limited suitability for accidents of other categories, 
such as those involving serious injuries. Thirdly, the definition 
of the tolerable risk according to MEM does not differentiate 
between different interest groups nor between different 
severities. As stated above, this work focuses on the definition 
of safety requirements for individual interest groups 
specifically for urban traffic. This aspect argues against the use 
of MEM for the introduction of automated driving. In 
summary, according to the stated reasons, the focus in the 
further course of this work will be on GAMAB. 
B.  Location as a disaggregation characteristic of traffic 
engineering analyses 
In order to determine the accepted risks of automated 
driving in a given location, the current risks of the existing 
reference system in the same location must first be identified 
in accordance with the GAMAB principle. [5]  
Moreover, it is necessary to resort to traffic statistical 
surveys of different institutions. Examples are the traffic 
accident statistics for Germany of the Federal Statistical Office 
(Destatis) and the mileage surveys of the Federal Highway 
Research Institute (BASt). However, there is one major 
drawback when using accident statistics as reference: Traffic 
participants that tolerate a higher risk than others are more 
likely involved in accidents or suffer more serious injuries (e.g 
because of not wearing a seatbelt or speeding). Thus, accident 
statistics overestimate the reference risk for traffic participants 
in average. Nevertheless, they are used here as a reference, as 
the overestimation cannot be quantified and there is no better 
reference available. 
 Furthermore these sources distinguish only between three 
localities: urban, extra-urban (excluding motorways) and 
motorway. [12, 13] A further differentiation for example into 
"town", "municipality" and "rural group settlements", is not 
made. This is due to the significant differences in traffic law 
between the three official localities. This becomes particularly 
clear when comparing motorways with other localities based 
on the legal framework conditions: 
 Motorways may only be used if the maximum design 
speed of the motor vehicle used is greater than 60 
km/h. [14] 
 Pedestrians are not allowed to enter motorways. [14] 
 Level crossings must not be present on motorways. 
[15] 
 Motorways must be equipped with special junctions 
for access and exit. [15] 
Correspondingly sharp legal demarcations such as those 
described above exist between the three locations "in towns", 
"outside towns" and "on motorways", but not within them. 
This means that supposedly urban traffic situations such as 
intersections, traffic lights or pedestrian scenarios may occur 
not only in cities but also in rural areas and vice versa. 
Therefore, the approach of the institutions mentioned above, 
to not further break down localities in the context of traffic 
statistics surveys, is justified. 
For the present study, however, this means that the 
definition of macroscopic safety requirements - in the absence 
of the necessary data material - cannot be made specifically for 
automated driving in cities, but only more generally for 




Before the current risks can be quantified, it is necessary to 
discuss which of these risks are representative of the local 
traffic situation and which risks can be quantified in general. 
This means, for example, that the following questions must be 
addressed: 
 Is it sufficient to consider accidents with fatalities 
within built-up areas or should other categories such 
as accidents with serious injuries be considered as a 
supplement? 
 Are accident figures, on the one hand, or casualty 
figures, on the other hand, more suitable for 
quantifying risks? 
 Which interest groups are characteristic of urban 
traffic and how do they differ from those on 
motorways? 
 Which variables other than for e.g. mileage are 
suitable to relate accident or casualty figures to them? 
These questions are discussed in the following sections. 
A. Determination of an observation level for the severity of 
accident consequences 
The German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) 
distinguishes between six accident categories, which are listed 
in the following hierarchical structure (see Figure 3). [12, p. 
20] 
 
Figure 3:Classification of accidents (according to Destatis [12, p. 
20]) 
The classification of accidents into one of these categories 
is always based on the most serious consequences of the 
accident. An accident is classified in category 1 if at least one 
person involved in the accident dies within 30 days. The 
criterion for distinguishing between minor and serious injuries 
is whether an inpatient hospital stay is required immediately 
after the accident. If there are no injured persons,  but at least 
one motor vehicle involved is no longer roadworthy and the 
cause of the accident was also a criminal offence or an 
administrative offence, this is classified as a "serious accident 
involving damage to property in the narrower sense" (category 
4). If, on the other hand, all involved motor vehicles are still 
roadworthy and the persons involved were under the influence 
of intoxicating substances such as alcohol, the accident is 
classified in category 6: "other property damage accident 
under the influence of intoxicating substances". All remaining 
property damage accidents are classified in category 5, “other 
property damage accidents”. [12] 
1) Accidents with fatalities (category 1) 
Human life has an outstanding protection status by law. 
This is already evident from Article 2 of the Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, according to which every 
person has "the right to life". [16] Based on this, an ethics 
committee, which was convened by the Federal Ministry of 
Transport and Digital Infrastructure, published 20 ethical rules 
in one of its reports, which are aimed at automated and 
networked vehicle traffic. The need for protection of human 
life is manifested in the standards of this ethics committee. For 
example, the second of the rules mentioned is: "The protection 
of people takes precedence over all other considerations of 
utility". [10] Based on these legal and ethical principles, it is 
not possible to define macroscopic safety requirements for 
automated driving solely based on material damage accidents, 
for example. In contrast, it is mandatory to consider fatal 
accidents.  
This is also shown in the macroscopic safety requirements 
for automated driving on motorways presented by Junietz et 
al. [5] who take fatal accidents into account. Nonetheless, the 
hypothesis exists that the distribution over the categories stated 
above differs significantly between motorways and built-up 
areas. For example, the higher (average) speeds on motorways 
lead to the assumption that accidents on motorways tend to be 
more fatal and that the percentage of minor accidents is lower 
than in built-up areas. If this hypothesis is correct, it should be 
discussed whether accident categories that are more prevalent 
in built-up areas should be used in addition to the mandatory 
category of fatal accidents when defining macroscopic safety 
requirements. 
2) Accidents involving damage to property and accidents 
involving minor injuries (categories 3-6) 
To test the above hypothesis accident data from the Federal 
Statistical Office for the year 2018 [12, pp. 56-58] and a ten-
year observation period (2009 to 2018) was used, both 
allowing a differentiated analysis by location and accident 
category. Comparing the stated accident data, it becomes clear 
that the percentual category distribution for the two localities 
differ only marginally. Once again, the differences in the 
accident category distribution between build-up areas and 
motorways are smaller than expected. The picture that was 
already apparent in the 2018 study alone is confirmed and the 
hypothesis presented at the beginning is thus further 
questioned. 
There are several possible explanations for the 
phenomenon that the distribution of accidents involving 
property damage, injuries and fatalities does not differ 
significantly between the two locations compared here - 
despite the higher speeds on motorways:  
In comparison to inner-city roads, motorways have more 
construction measures, which serve to reduce harm and avoid 
fatal consequences of accidents. For example, protective 
barriers or similar measures are prescribed on motorways to 
maintain "separate lanes for directional traffic". According to 
the law, motorways must also be "free of junctions at the same 
level". [15] 
Furthermore, the Road Traffic Regulations (StVO) [14] 
restrict the types of traffic permitted on motorways compared 
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by pedestrians and cyclists are excluded from traffic on 
motorways. This means that within the built-up areas, the 
proportion of unprotected or at most lightly-protected road 
users is higher. If representatives of these groups are involved 
in an accident, the probability that it will end in more than just 
material damage is apparently greater than, for example, in the 
case of accidents involving only one type of vehicle. This is 
confirmed by the surveys of the Federal Statistical Office, 
according to which the majority of intra-urban fatalities in 
2017 were among the weaker road users. [17]  
In summary, various factors on and for motorways exist 
that mitigate the consequences of accidents and help 
compensate for the fatal effects of higher speeds. These factors 
provide an explanation for the nearly congruent distribution of 
the two locations. 
In the course of the location-dependent comparison of 
accident distributions - in addition to the accident mitigating 
factors on motorways mentioned above - it is also necessary to 
consider how the accident data was collected. In this concern, 
the Federal Statistical Office makes the following statement: 
"According to law, the police stations whose officers recorded 
the accident are obliged to provide information. It follows that 
the statistics only record accidents for which the police were 
called in; these are mainly those with serious consequences. 
In particular, a relatively large proportion of traffic accidents 
with only material damage or with only minor injuries are not 
reported to the police.” [12, p. 10] Accordingly, there is a 
discrepancy between the actual accident figures on the one 
hand and the numbers of accidents recorded by the police on 
the other - the so-called dark figure. [18] 
It is generally assumed that the estimated number of 
unrecorded accidents involving serious injuries and fatalities 
both on motorways and in built-up areas is negligible, as there 
is an obligation to report these two categories. [12] The 
unrecorded figures for the remaining accident categories 3 to 
6, on the other hand, are firstly higher and secondly differ 
depending on the location of the town or the type of road. In 
other words, the estimated number of unreported accidents 
involving property damage and minor injuries is lower for 
motorways than that for other localities. [18] One explanation 
for these different estimates is that the police are increasingly 
intervening on motorways even in the case of less serious 
accidents since minor accidents as well can have a massive 
impact on the traffic situation. [19, p. 6] 
Irrespective of the reasons for the higher number of 
unreported accidents involving property damage and minor 
injuries in built-up areas, the following conclusions can be 
drawn from the distributions: The actual distributions will 
differ from them in that the proportion of property damage 
accidents will no longer be 88 to 89 per cent, but will be even 
higher within built-up areas and on motorways. In addition, the 
real proportion of property damage accidents will be higher 
within built-up areas than that on motorways. This 
circumstance is in line with the hypothesis set above.  
Estimates suggest that the true accident figures for 
property damage accidents could be more than seven times 
higher than the recorded numbers. In the case of accidents 
involving minor injuries, the corresponding factor is over 4.5. 
[18] It remains questionable how high the number of 
unreported cases actually is and whether it is even possible to 
quantify them realistically. On the other hand, it seems 
undisputed that accident figures associated with such a large 
degree of uncertainty do not provide a solid data basis for 
defining macroscopic safety requirements for automated 
driving. For this reason, accidents in categories 3 to 6 will not 
be included in the further course of the present study - neither 
on their own nor in addition to the accidents with fatalities that 
will be definitively considered. 
3) Accidents with serious injuries (category 2) 
Seriously injured persons are included in the official 
statistics if they are "immediately admitted to hospital for in-
patient treatment (at least 24 hours)" and do not succumb to 
the accident-related injuries within 30 days. If death occurs 
within 30 days of the accident event, the injured are counted 
as fatalities. In the event of death later, they continue to be 
considered as seriously injured only - even if the death is 
undoubtedly due to the accident or its consequences. [12] 
If the definition of macroscopic safety requirements for 
automated driving within built-up areas were based solely on 
the number of fatalities - according to the above definition - 
then the safety requirements would not take into account 
fatally injured persons whose death occurred later than 30 days 
after the accident. However, from a moral philosophical point 
of view, it makes no difference whether a person dies because 
of an accident 29 or 31 days after the accident.  
Furthermore, there are two existing ways to reduce the 
number of fatal accidents. Firstly, a complete avoidance of a 
fatal accident event without the occurrence of any accident. 
Secondly, an accident that could not have been avoided occurs, 
but its severity was mitigated: E.g. an accident with fatalities 
becomes one with serious injuries. This implies that 
minimizing the risk of fatal accidents entails an increase in the 
risk for other categories. Wachenfeld and Winner emphasize 
that when automated driving functions are released "not only 
a reduction in the number of accidents must be demonstrated, 
but also an accepted relationship [...] between avoided [...] 
and additionally caused risks [...]”. [20, p. 442] If a fatal 
accident is transformed into an accident with serious injuries 
by automated driving functions, this corresponds to the 
minimization of one risk while increasing another at the same 
time. In order to address the relationship between the two types 
of risk - as demanded by Wachenfeld and Winner - the 
definition of safety requirements based exclusively on fatal 
accidents is not sufficient.  
In addition, with approximately 0.1 percent, fatal accidents 
make up only a marginal proportion of all accidents within 
built-up areas and are therefore - purely in terms of their 
number - not representative of all accidents. [12] In order for 
the macroscopic safety requirements to cover a larger share of 
the total number of accidents within built-up areas, at least one 
additional accident category must be added to the definition of 
safety requirements. Accidents involving material damage in 
the categories 4 to 6 and accidents involving minor injuries 
(category 3) are not suitable due to the high number of 
unreported cases. Consequently, only accidents with seriously 
injured persons (category 2) remain as a supplementary option. 
 Therefore, in summary to the arguments stated above, the 
category of serious injuries should not be ignored when 
  
defining safety requirements. Accidents with serious injuries 
(category 2) should therefore also be taken into account when 
defining macroscopic safety requirements for automated 
driving in built-up areas. However, it has to be mentioned that 
increasing the number of safety levels considered for 
indicating macroscopic safety requirements, results in a 
similar proportional increase of workload for the safety 
approval itself. Nonetheless, from an ethical point of view, it 
seems at least questionable whether and to what extent the use 
of the workload as an argument is permissible with regard to 
the methodology of the procedure here, since the definition of 
macroscopic safety requirements focuses on the need to 
protect human life and not on an economic aspect. [10]  
B. Combination Methods for multiple accident categories 
In the previous section, it was motivated why two accident 
categories have to be considered for the determination of 
macroscopic safety requirements: Accidents with fatalities 
(category 1) and those with serious injuries (category 2). A 
question that now needs to be addressed is how to combine the 
data from the two categories, as several possibilities exist. 
A first potential option is the establishment of a summative 
limit value. This must not be exceeded by the sum of accidents 
involving fatalities and serious injuries. On the one hand, 
addressing the so-called problem of small numbers appears to 
be advantageous. Behind this problem lies the fact that 
although the numbers of fatal accidents are not small in 
absolute terms, in special cases they may still not be 
sufficiently large enough to make statistically significant 
statements. By adding accidents with serious injuries, the 
statistical data is expanded, thus making it possible to reduce 
the problem of small numbers. 
On the other hand, a summary consideration of the two 
accident categories implies that a fatal accident has the same 
consequences as an accident with serious injuries. However, it 
seems evident that the accepted marginal risks of both 
categories differ and that the implicit equality with regard to 
the severity of accidents does not reflect the real risk 
acceptance of the population. 
In order to take into account that a fatal accident is 
apparently more serious than one with severe injuries, a second 
approach consists in offsetting accidents from both categories 
against each other could be considered. This means, for 
example, that it could be determined and then defined that one 
fatal accident (category 1) corresponds to 10 serious injuries 
(category 2) in terms of severity of consequences. [5] This 
would in theory make it possible to generate a single limit 
value that covers both accident categories, as is already the 
case with the summative approach. However, the Ethics 
Committee on Automated and Networked Driving prohibits 
the offsetting of traffic accident victims. [10] Furthermore, it 
is not clear which factor should be used to convert one accident 
category into another. Therefore, the approach of converting 
accidents in one category into those in another category is also 
ruled out for the further procedure. 
The option remains of determining a separate, still-
tolerated limit value for both fatal accidents and accidents with 
serious injuries. This means that the number of accidents from 
category 1 must be below the limit value for accidents 
involving fatalities. In coexistence, the number of accidents 
from category 2 must not exceed the limit value for accidents 
with serious injuries. In contrast to the two previous 
approaches, two limits must therefore always be observed 
independently. Thus, there is no reduction to a common limit 
value for both accident severity levels. This increases the 
amount of work that has to be performed in the course of the 
statistical verification of the required safety. However, the 
amount of work is not doubled, since, for example, the step of 
converting accidents of one category into accidents of another 
category is no longer necessary. In addition, the procedure 
discussed here also enables more differentiated analyses than 
the two possible combinations of accident categories 1 and 2 
as discussed above. For example, if an automated vehicle 
would not initially meet its macroscopic safety requirements. 
In this case, the existence of individual limit values opens up 
the possibility of assessing which accident severity level is 
more likely to require addressing by appropriate measures in 
order to achieve approval. 
Due to the implicit equality of both accident categories that 
must be avoided, the ethical boundary conditions and the 
potential for differentiated analyses, the variant presented last 
will be further pursued. 
C. Trade-off between accident and casualty figures 
In its publications on traffic accidents, the Federal 
Statistical Office relates both accident and casualty figures to 
various reference values. [12] Therefore, in the further course 
of this work, it must be considered whether it is more 
appropriate to consider accidents on the one hand or casualties 
on the other to define macroscopic safety requirements for 
automated driving within built-up areas. 
A single accident may cause several victims and/or injured 
parties who are linked to the one accident and are therefore not 
independent in terms of the causing event. The casualty figures 
may vary for different accidents with the same event, as the 
casualty figures are depending on multiple boundary 
conditions that might not be possible to be conceived for a 
statistical analysis.  
In special cases, however, accidents also pose the problem 
of dependency. The following scenario illustrates this: an 
accident with personal injury occurs at an inner-city 
intersection involving the need of the police to control the 
traffic that is obstructed by the accident. Meanwhile, one of 
these officers is hit by a car and fatally injured. The subsequent 
accident would not have happened if the first accident that 
initiated the deployment of the police had not occurred. In this 
specific case, there is not only a dependency between the 
injured parties, but also between the two accidents. 
According to the Federal Statistical Office, scenarios such 
as the one described above however, belong to a category, 
which claims fewer than five per cent of fatal accidents within 
built-up areas in 2018. This also includes accidents involving 
road workers who are not involved in an accident, but who are 
on the roadway for work reasons, or accidents involving 
occupants of breakdown vehicles. [12] This means that the 
actual number of subsequent accidents outlined above will be 
even lower than the share of just under five percent as 
mentioned earlier. This supports the thesis that accidents with 
mutual dependency are exceptional rather than regular 
situations. 
  
 In conclusion, it can be stated that the accident figures 
have the potential to represent the one event that leads to at 
least one or more fatalities better than causality figures and are 
therefore preferable. Thus, the approach of using accident 
numbers instead of fatalities is used for the work described in 
this paper. 
D. Identification of relevant stakeholder groups 
Automated vehicles pose a risk to various groups of road 
users. The individual groups differ in terms of the risks they 
accept. [5] Accordingly, macroscopic safety requirements 
should not be defined for road users in general, but rather for 
specific groups. As a basis for this group-specific definition of 
macroscopic safety requirements, the first step is to identify 
the relevant stakeholder groups for automated driving within 
built-up areas.  
According to [5], it is possible to divide all stakeholders of 
automated driving into three general groups: the users of 
automated vehicles, other road users and society. Although it 
can be argued that users and other road users also belong to 
society, society here denotes that part of the population which 
is not directly affected by the accident-related fate of an 
individual, but for which only the total number of accidents is 
relevant. In the further course of this work, the focus will be 
on the interest group of other road users and their sub-groups, 
which are yet to be determined, since the users of automated 
vehicles are attributed higher tolerated border risks in the 
relevant literature. The latter assumption is based on two 
factors. Firstly, although every newly introduced technology 
carries a new and/or additional risk, this is accepted by its users 
because they hope to gain a profit from its use in other respects. 
Secondly, commercial, i.e. work-related, or even involuntary 
use of automated vehicles is not to be expected in typical cases 
of application in the short to medium term. It is assumed that 
the use of automated driving functions is almost exclusively 
voluntary. [5] In cases of voluntary risk exposure the tolerated 
limit risks are always higher than for occupational or 
involuntary exposure. [5] Consequently, other road users who 
may potentially be involved in accidents with automated 
vehicles constitute a more critical stakeholder group than the 
users themselves. Furthermore, they represent the majority of 
society. These arguments justify the non-exclusive but 
concentrated analysis of other road users as the most 
important stakeholder group with respect to macroscopic 
safety requirements for automated driving. 
The range of other road users is wider within built-up 
areas than on motorways, as there are several limiting factors 
for participation in motorway traffic. For example, according 
to § 18 of the German Road Traffic Regulations (StVO), 
vehicles on motorways are only allowed if maximum design 
speed of the vehicle is greater than 60 km/h. [14] In order to 
take this diversity into account, the top level group 
classification according to [5] is further differentiated. This is 
done with the help of a list from the German Federal Statistical 
Office, which provides information on the current existing 
types of traffic participation. [12, pp. 18-19] 
However, the performance of risk acceptance analyses at 
the level of the finest granularity of the classification of 
stakeholders in road traffic is associated with a statistical 
problem, the before mentioned so-called law of small 
numbers. [23] An example that illustrates this problem: In 
2018, there was just one fatal accident in German build-up 
areas involving an S-pedelec. [12] It seems evident that a 
single accident does not provide a sufficiently large data basis 
to make statistically significant statements about the tolerated 
risk. For this reason, single stakeholders are grouped into 
interest groups. 
To overcome the statistical problem of the small numbers, 
the minimum number of accidents has to be identified that 
expresses the statistical significance of the minimum group 
size in order to form such interest groups. We suppose to 
estimate this number based on an approach to approximate the 
minimum sample size for a given margin of error 𝑒, the so 
called Z-Score 𝑧1−α 2⁄  and the variance  𝜎
2 of the underlying 
probability distribution according to [22, p. 218]: 
𝑛 = (





 As supposed in section III.A, this work differentiates 
between accidents with fatalities (index 1) and accidents with 
serve injuries (index 2). The minimum group size for both 
categories 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 is calculated independently and the more 
restrictive result is considered for accumulating different types 
of road users into interest groups.  
To determine 𝑛, the accident statistics for the period from 
2009 to 2018 are utilized and modelled as a multinomial 
distribution. Data before 2009 is not considered as multiple 
factors, e.g. safety increasing regulations, are increasing the 
road safety continuously, like for example a framework 
directive of the European Union (EU) on the mandatory 
equipping of new vehicles in various classes with lane 
departure warning systems and emergency brake assistants has 
only been in existence since 2009. [26, p. 6]  .  For this reason, 
it is not considered expedient to use data older than ten years 
when modelling the occurrence of accidents In contrast, 
however, it is also not sufficient to consider only statistics for 
the most recent or most recently evaluated year, as accident 
figures are subject to fluctuations. 
This fluctuation is shown by the variance 𝜎2 which can be 
calculated directly from the accidents numbers from 2009 to 
2018 for both categories independently. [27] This variance of 
the overall accident numbers is used to conservatively 
approximate the variance of the accident numbers of the 
individual interest groups that should be identified. The yearly 
overall fluctuation is likely to be bigger than the variance of a 
single stakeholder but not guaranteed as fluctuations of single 
interest group may vary in size and could even compensate 
themselves when added to the overall number of accidents. 
As stated by the equation above, to calculate 𝑛, the error e 
has to be defined as well. We propose an approximation by 
utilizing the mean value error 𝜎?̅? = √𝜇 𝑚⁄   to achieve a 
definition within a plausible order of magnitude. While 𝑚 
being the number of measurements (10 years), 𝜇 is the overall 
expectation value for the number of accidents observed in the 
observed span of 10 years and is therefore different for 
accidents of category 1 and 2. Utilizing the statistical data from 
Destatis, the resulting mean errors 𝜎?̅?,1 = √1008 10⁄ = 10 
and 𝜎?̅?,2 = √33267 10⁄ = 57.7 are used to approximate the 
  
errors by rounding 𝜎?̅? to the next lower number of ten to 𝑒1 =
10 and 𝑒2 = 50. This approach is a conservative 
approximation for the minimum sample size 𝑛, as a lower 
value of 𝑒 leads to a higher value of 𝑛.  
Lastly, the Z-Score 𝑧1−α 2⁄  can be read from tables 
depending on the significance level 𝛼. [24, p. 3] For the further 
course of this work, the significance level is defined to the 
typical value 𝛼 = 5 % in order to achieve a balance between 
the statistical errors of the so called first and second type. [22, 
p. 225] [29] 
Finally, this leads to 𝑛1 = 230 for accidents of category 1, 
which is the annual number of fatal accidents in built-up areas 
that must be present at least when individual stakeholders are 
grouped to form a statistically significant interest group. For 
accidents of category 2 (with serious injuries) the minimum 
number of accidents is 𝑛2 = 1833 accordingly. If the group-
internal number of accidents for the corresponding categories 
is smaller than 𝑛1 or respectively 𝑛2, other stakeholders or 
types of traffic involvement have to be added to the affected 
group until the stated minimum numbers for fatal as well as 
accidents with serve injuries is reached. 
The fact that there is only a factor of about 8 between 𝑛1 
and 𝑛2 seems paradoxical at first glance since the factor 
between the expected values of both accident categories is 33. 
According to [24, p. 2], however, this is a typical phenomenon 
of sampling theory. For example, "the sample size hardly 
changes if the stratum from which the sample is drawn 
contains 2,000 or 20,000 units [...]." 
It needs to mentioned, that other ways to calculate the 
minimum sample size exist, which are specialized for 
multinomial distributions and need to be evaluated in the 
future, e.g. those summarized in [27]. Respecting on the 
minimum number of accidents that must be considered when 
aggregating stakeholders into sufficiently large interest 
groups, two different approaches are discussed: 
1. On the one hand, a stakeholder under consideration, 
e.g. the type bus, which does not meet the requirement 
of statistical significance for accidents with fatalities 
(21 in 2008), can be bundled with another stakeholder 
that on its own already meets the requirements for 
minimum accident figures. This is the case, for 
example, with passenger cars (554 fatal accidents in 
built-up areas in 2018) [12] One argument in favor of 
combining buses and passenger cars is that both 
means of transport primarily serve to transport 
passengers. By contrast, the similarities in terms of 
spatial dimensions and masses favor combining buses 
and cargo road transport vehicles. 
2. On the other hand, another possibility is to combine 
several types of traffic participation, which all on their 
own do not fulfill the statistically required minimum 
number of accidents, but in total represent a 
significant group. As examples - in addition to the 
buses already mentioned - railway vehicles, trams, 
tractors, good transporters, other motor vehicles and 
other and unknown vehicles can be mentioned as well, 
where fewer than the required number of accidents 
with fatalities within built-up areas occurred in 2018. 
[12] By combining the mentioned types the statistical 
problem of small numbers can be circumvented. In 
addition to the stochastic motives, a further argument 
in favor of this grouping is that there is a higher degree 
of similarity between these types of traffic 
participation in terms of their construction-related 
characteristics and the resulting transport volumes 
than, for example, between trams and passenger cars.  
For both methods, the grouping should take into account 
the extent to which individual types of traffic participation are 
protected from the influence of a potential accident opponent. 
The adjective protected here does not mean protection by law 
and/or written safety requirements, but rather direct, physical 
protection by helmets, protectors, airbags, etc. In this context, 
official road accident statistics repeatedly refer to "unprotected 
road users".  
Based on the above arguments, the second methodology of 
grouping is used in calculating the exemplary safety reference 
in the following sections. However, in any case there is a 
certain degree of arbitrariness left for every combination. Also 
is should be noted that due to the usage of different types of 
road users to create groups, accidents are most likely counted 
multiple times in the overall perspective. E.g. if a car and a 
pedestrian are involved in fatal accident, this accident is 
represented in both total numbers of accidents for this type of 
road users. Also as cars might be involved in accidents without 
any other type of road user, this is almost never true for 
accidents with pedestrians. Nonetheless, an accident that is 
counted in more than one group of road users created a risk for 
more than this one group and therefore has a certain (but not 
unquestionable) degree of validity to be represented in 
multiple safety requirements indices.  
In addition to the one interest group already explained in 
the example, further interest groups are grouped in a similar 
way. Finally, the group classification method explained above 
leads to five different interest groups as subgroups of other 
road users who are one of the three stakeholder groups 
explained in section III.D. These are summarized in Figure 4: 
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E. Determination of a suitable reference value for accident 
figures 
In its publications on road accidents, the German Federal 
Statistical Office addresses various reference values, which are 
used to relate accident figures to them, resulting in accident 
indicators. [12] In domains other than road transport - rail 
vehicle technology and aviation for example - certain 
reference parameters have emerged particularly suitable for 
their respective mode of transport. [5] In the following section, 
these reference values are analyzed with regard to their 
suitability in the context of this work. 
An intuition-based assumption regarding the causality 
between the number of vehicles and the frequency of accidents 
is that a larger number of vehicles also lead to an increase in 
the number of accidents. However, the statistics [12] show that 
a corresponding positive correlation is not given across the 
board. 
Since the inner-city road network is not exclusively used 
by motor vehicles, but also by non-motorized road users, the 
road length as a reference value aims at a larger number of 
types of road users than, for example, the total number of 
vehicles. In contrast, the risk of a road accident on a road exists 
only when the road is actually used - similar to the fact that a 
motor vehicle only poses an immediate risk when it is used in 
traffic. One way to address this problem is to use traffic density 
as a reference, which is defined as the number of vehicles per 
section of road. [30] Traffic density is thus based on the length 
of the road, but in contrast to this, it also allows a statement to 
be made as to whether and to what extent the infrastructure is 
used. However, as length figures for the same road can differ 
significantly depending on the road length definition on which 
the survey is based, there is a risk of misunderstanding and/or 
wrong assumptions when using the road length or the traffic 
density - which is based on it - as a reference for accident 
figures.  
In Germany, the registration of residents in a defined 
geographical area is regulated by law, namely by the Federal 
Registration Act. [31] The fact that registration registers are 
kept by the registration authorities, and consequently the 
population figures are based on a law, this parameter has an 
advantage over other potential reference variables such as the 
above mentioned road length. The surveys are unambiguous 
due to their legally regulated recording. Additionally, in the 
context of other domains, the maximum tolerated risks are also 
often given per person per year. This is for example the case 
for occupational risks or within the risk analyses of large-scale 
technologies such as nuclear energy. [5] The use of the 
population figures as a reference value has therefore the 
advantage that it allows risks to be compared across different 
domains. Contrarily, statements about traffic volumes can only 
be made to a limited extent based on population figures. It 
cannot be ruled out that individual members of the population 
may only contribute to a negligible extent to the traffic 
volume. For individuals, however, an immediate risk arises 
only through actual participation in traffic events. This argues 
in the favor of preferring reference values that are inevitably 
linked to traffic participation and thus the resulting exposure 
to risk. 
In aviation, the majority of accidents happen during take-
off or landing. Additionally, longer travel distances are 
covered compared to ground-based traffic. The combination of 
these two circumstances and the fact, that each flight can either 
end with an accident or not, justifies the approach to use the 
number of flights rather than the distance as a reference value 
for accident rates. [5] An analogous approach for automated 
driving within built-up areas would be to use the number of 
trips as a reference value for traffic accidents. The counterpart 
to accidents during take-off or landing in aviation is the 
accident type "collision with another vehicle that starts, stops 
or is stationary" [12]. However, in contrast to aviation this 
particular accident type does not dominate road traffic within 
built-up areas. In 2018, for example, the proportion of 
accidents with another vehicle involving injuries was only 
7.8%. In relation to accidents with fatalities, the figure was 
only 2.4 %. [12] 
In the context of railway safety, tolerated marginal risks 
are defined by means of a maximum number of errors per hour. 
[32] The reference value used is therefore a time interval. The 
procedure of relating errors, accidents or damage to rail 
vehicles not to a spatial but to a temporal distance can be 
justified as follows: Railway vehicles are already more closely 
connected with their infrastructure than road vehicles. 
Consequently, technical faults, which have the potential of 
safety-critical states, can be located not only in the rail vehicle 
itself, but also on the railway infrastructure. Therefore, the 
requirement for a reference value for faults in railway safety 
systems suggests that a part of the risk results from stationary 
installations. This makes the use of a time interval seem an 
adequate solution. In road transport however, there is no 
sophisticated level of communication or networking between 
vehicles and the infrastructure.  
In the previous remarks, it has already been mentioned that 
values representing actual participation in traffic should be 
preferred as only the traffic participation causes the risk 
exposure. While the driven distance meets this requirement, it 
can be argued that, although it implies actual participation in 
traffic, this only applies to motor vehicles and not to 
pedestrians, cyclists or any other possible types of traffic 
participation. However, although the driven distance, does not 
allow statements to be made for all stakeholders about actual 
participation features, still has the advantage of taking some 
(even the major) participation in transport in to account. 
Furthermore, only the driven distance within built-up areas 
allows the comparison with other existing research results on 
automated driving to be made, as it has already been used as a 
reference value when defining macroscopic safety 
requirements for automated driving on motorways. [5]  
In passenger transport, transportation performance is 
defined as the product of the mileage performed and the 
number of passengers transported within a specific 
observation period. It is used, for example, in the context of 
studies on safety in public transport, where a large number of 
people are transported per vehicle. According to [33] the 
average car occupancy rate in Germany in 2016 was only 1.46 
persons per vehicle. Consequently, a method transfer from 
public transport to automated driving is not considered 
necessary here. In addition, two input variables are required to 
calculate the transport performance. Therefore, there are also 
two potential sources of inaccuracies in data collection 
  
After weighing up the discussed advantages and 
disadvantages of all potential reference values that are 
summarized in Table 1, the driven distance proves to be the 
most suitable. 
Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of pot. reference values 















































































































data for different localities 
exists 
- + + ○ ○ - - + - 
implies traffic 
participation  
- - + - - + ○ + + 
addresses different kind 
vehicle typs in use 
○ + + + + ○ ○ ○ ○ 
is unambiguous 
 
+ - - + + - ○ + ○ 
allows comparison with 
other domains 
- - - + ○ - ○ - ○ 
allows comparison with 
req. for AD on highway 
- - - - - - - + - 
motivation of use in other 
domains is valid in built-
up areas 
○ ○ ○ + ○ - - + - 
 
F. Quantification of the driven distance as reference value 
The survey of the German Federal Highway Research 
Institute (BASt) is used to quantify the driven distance as a 
reference value. [34] The BASt distinguishes between 
"resident mileage" and "domestic mileage". Resident mileage 
is the total mileage of motor vehicles registered in Germany. 
Not only distances travelled in Germany are included in the 
surveys, but also the distances travelled on foreign roads. In 
contrast, the total mileage performed on domestic, i.e. 
German, roads is included in the statistics as domestic mileage, 
irrespective of the origin of the vehicles responsible for this 
mileage. [34, p. 17] 
The macroscopic safety requirements to be defined 
represent key figures where accident figures are reflected in 
the numerator and driving performance in the denominator. To 
ensure that the numerator and denominator have the same 
spatial reference, the accident figures are not to be set in 
relation to resident mileage, but rather in relation to domestic 
mileage.  
The BASt points out that there are two different concepts 
for determining such key figures [34, pp. 77-78]: 
The first concept involves breaking down both numerator 
and denominator of the key figure according to the same 
characteristic (such as street class, location, vehicle type, 
vehicle nationality, etc.). As this concept is the most logical as 
it expresses the direct risk for each stakeholder, this 
breakdown concept is only practicable if data is available for 
accident figures and in the survey of mileage (within built-up 
areas) for each single type of road user. This means for 
example that the driven distance by bicylcle within build-up 
areas would be needed, which differs from the overall driven 
distance, that is included in statistic, as bicycles are quite often 
used outside built-up areas as well. 
The second concept is that the numerator of the risk 
indicator is disaggregated, while the denominator - 
irrespective of the characteristic value in the numerator - 
always remains constant. 
For the definition of macroscopic safety requirements for 
automated driving within built-up areas, a mixture of both 
variants is used, since two differentiating characteristics are 
distinguished, namely the location and the type of traffic 
involvement and only limited data for the expression of the 
mobility usage of an individual interest group or even single 
type of road user exists.  
The type of vehicle or traffic involvement represents the 
second differentiating characteristic, since the macroscopic 
safety requirements have to be defined for different interest 
groups. With regard to this feature, the second presented 
concept is used, since the available statistical data does not 
allow a distribution of the mileage among the different interest 
groups. In other words, the accident figures of different 
stakeholders are related to the same mileage value, i.e. the total 
mileage produced by all types of road transport operators 
together. This averages to 193.5 billion kilometers per year in 
urban areas. [34, pp. 67-68] 
IV. RESULTS 
The findings from the previous sections are combined to 
derive the macroscopic safety requirements for automated 
driving within built-up areas. Therefore, the previously 
determined interest groups and driving performance data are 
used and presented individually in the following section: 
A. Safety requirements of other road users 
Based on the accident statistics for 2014-2018 [12, 35–38] 
and the average mileage in urban areas over the same period 
[34], Table 2 shows the safety requirements in terms of the 
calculated performance indicators for the interest groups 
defined in section III.D. According to the GAMAB principle 
(cf. II.A.3)), these correspond to the macroscopic safety 
requirements for automated driving in urban environments 
from the perspective of other road users. 
Table 2: Macroscopic safety requirements of other road users 
Interest Group  1 2 3 4 5 
Accidents with 
fatalities per year 
582 166 272 253 367 
Accidents with 
serious injuries per 
year in thousands 
23.4 6.6 3.6 12.5 7.5 
aggregated driving 
performance in km 
per year 





3.0·10-9 0.9·10-9 1.4·10-9 1.3·10-9 1.9·10-9 
Max value: 
Accidents w/ serious 
injuries per  
aggregated  km 
12 · 10-8 3.4 · 10-8 1.9 · 10-8 6.5 · 10-8 39 · 10-8 
  
B. Safety requirements of society 
In section III.D, society was defined as that part of the 
population which is not directly affected by the accident-
related fate of an individual, but for which only the total 
number of accidents is relevant. For this reason, the annual 
totals of all fatal accidents as well as the annual totals of all 
accidents with serious injuries within urban areas are used to 
define macroscopic safety requirements for this interest group. 
Analogous to the requirements of other road users defined in 
section IV.A, the following safety requirement for the society 
results in, according to the GAMAB risk acceptance principle, 
less than 5.0∙10-9 accidents with fatalities and simultaneously 
a maximum of 1.7∙10-7 accidents with serious injuries per 
kilometer. 
C. Safety requirements of users of automated vehicles 
The users of automated vehicles are attributed borderline 
risks that exceed the current risks of manual driving, as they 
voluntarily expose themselves to the risk. The risk acceptance 
principle GAMAB, which was used for the risk acceptance 
analyses of the other interest groups, only reflects current 
risks. [8] In order to derive the higher marginal risks of the 
users of automated vehicles from the current risks of manual 
driving, a surcharge factor or an additive risk surcharge is 
required. In connection with the MEM risk acceptance 
principle, [8] specifies risk values by which an existing risk 
may be maximally increased by the introduction of a new 
technology or a new transport system. The MEM principle 
thus provides the necessary additive risk surcharges. For this 
reason, the two principles GAMAB and MEM are combined 
below. This means that the tolerated marginal risks of the 
automated vehicles users are given by the sums of the marginal 
risks from the GAMAB and MEM principles:  




This approach was also followed by [5] to define 
macroscopic safety requirements for automated driving on 
motorways. In the equation above, 𝑅 is the general symbol for 
a risk. The index U is an abbreviation for the users of 
automated vehicles while the index s indicates that the risks 
are given in terms of distance and the index  t  indicates a time-
based risk figure. While 𝑅GAMAB represents the current risks of 
manual driving according to the GAMAB principle, 𝑅MEM 
here does not refer to the minimum endogenous mortality 
itself, but to the additive risk surcharges that are derived from 
it and can be taken from standards or tables. [8, p. 59] 
In [8], which defines the MEM principle, the values for 
𝑅MEM,t are time-related and correspond to 1/20
th of the 
minimum endogenous mortality MEM/20 (cp. section II.A.2)  
. Since in section III.E the mileage was selected as the 
reference value for accident figures, the values given per 
person and year from [8] must be converted into distance-
related values. For this reason, a division is made by the 
distance ?̅? that a person per year travels on average within 
urban environments in Germany. For the first 
summand 𝑅GAMAB,s, the accepted limit risk from the point of 
view of society is used (cf. section IV.B), since the future users 
of automated vehicles cannot be assigned to a specific interest 
group as defined in section III.D. 
The values for 𝑅MEM,t used in the second summand are 
derived from [8]. For fatal accidents (category 1), the standard 
specifies a maximum value of 10-5 fatalities per person per 
year. For accidents with serious injuries (category 2), the 
maximum value is 10-4 seriously injured persons per person 
per year. However, these limit values address casualties and 
not accident figures. Since the latter was  selected as the 
preferred parameter in section III.C, the maximum number of 
casualties from [8] have to be converted into maximum 
accident figures. The factors required for this are derived by 
dividing the accident figures by causality figures ( for the years 
2014-2018, using data from [12]) to 0.977 for category 1 
accidents and 0.938 for category 2 accidents. Thus, the values 
to be used for 𝑅MEM,t are 0.977∙10
-5 fatal accidents per person 
per year and 0.938∙10-4 accidents with serious injuries per 
person per year. 
The average travel distance ?̅? within urban areas per 
person per year is estimated with 3,360 km, based on [34].  
This results in the following macroscopic safety 
requirements for users of automated vehicles:  
Less than 7.9∙10-9 accidents with fatalities and at the same 
time a maximum of 2.0∙10-7 accidents with serious injuries per 
aggregated kilometer occur. 
D. Discussion of results 
The marginal accepted safety requirement of other road 
users ranges from 2.6∙10-10 to 3.0∙10-9 accidents with fatalities 
per aggregated kilometer, depending on the type of other road 
users. The society’s marginal risk is higher than that of other 
road users by factors of 1.7 to 19.2. The users of automated 
vehicles even tolerate risks that exceed the marginal risk of the 
society by a factor of 1.6. Figure 5 illustrates these conditions. 
In section III.D, it was argued that the group of other road 
users are the most critical stakeholders and that, in contrast, 
users of automate vehicles are the ones with the highest 
tolerated marginal risks. This theory is supported by the above-
mentioned conditions as illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of inner urban marginal risks for accidents 
with fatalities 
When comparing the marginal risks of other road users 
with those of the other two superordinate interest groups, it 
should be born in mind that the former has been divided into 
sub interest groups. The probability of being specifically 
involved in an accident as a representative of one of these sub 
interest groups is always lower than that of being involved in 
an accident at all. Since the probability of occurrence is by 
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definition a factor in the risk, in addition to the amount of 
damage, the safety requirements of the other road users are 
consequently lower than in the summative analyses of society 
and the users of automated vehicles. This observation applies 
not only to the accidents with fatalities as discussed above, but 
also to accidents with serious injuries, which are illustrated in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of inner urban marginal risks for accidents 
with serious injuries 
Once again, the users of automated vehicles present 
themselves as the interest group with the highest tolerated 
risks, while other road users represent the most critical interest 
group. A comparison of Figure 5 and Figure 6 indicates that 
the numbers of accepted accidents with serious injuries per 
interest group are higher than the corresponding numbers of 
accepted accidents with fatalities, which meets the 
expectations. 
Macroscopic safety requirements or tolerated limit risks 
for automated driving on motorways are only derived for 
accidents with fatalities by [5]. Accordingly, the possibility of 
a direct comparison of inner urban and motorway-related 
marginal risks for accidents with serious injuries is not given. 
For this reason, the following explanations refer exclusively to 
accidents with fatalities. 
Figure 7 illustrates that the inner urban marginal risks 
exceed those of motorway traffic. This means that within built-
up areas, higher numbers of fatal accidents per kilometer are 
assigned to the acceptable risks. This situation is in line with 
expectations since motorways are considered the safest of the 
three locations compared to built-up areas and out-of-town 
roads - especially if accidents per kilometer serve as a 
reference. [5]  
With regard to the users of automated vehicles, the risks 
still tolerated in built-up areas exceed those of motorway 
traffic by a factor of 3.6. For society, motorway-related 
marginal risks are indicated in relation to predicted field 
proportions of automated vehicles in [5]. Consequently, it is 
not possible to determine a single risk factor as in the case of 
users of automated vehicles. Instead, depending on the 
assumed field share, marginal risks are attributed to the 
society, which within built-up areas are 2.8 to 17.2 times 
higher than their motorway-related counterparts. For other 
road users, there is an additional dependency on which of the 
sub interest groups formed is considered. Depending on the 
assumed field share and sub interest group, the factors between 
the marginal risks on motorways and those within built-up 
areas amount to up to 47.6. [5] 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of inner urban and motorway-related 
marginal risks (based on [5]) 
ISO 26262 recommends assigning an "Automotive Safety 
Integrity Level" (ASIL) to each potentially hazardous event. 
[2] This assignment is made on the basis of the three 
parameters "severity", "probability of exposure" and 
"controllability". Depending on their constellation, one of the 
five levels QM, ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL C or ASIL D results.  
ASIL D represents the highest safety requirement and 
addresses life-threatening as well as fatal injuries. In this 
respect, ASIL D goes hand in hand with the accident 
categories 1 (accidents with fatalities) and 2 (accidents with 
serious injuries), which are considered in the context of the 
present work. 
For ASIL D systems, the required probability of error or 
failure per operation hour is less than 10-8. [2] Using average 
vehicle speeds, this can be converted into maximum numbers 
of acceptable errors per kilometer. According to [39], the 
average speed is 24.1 km/h within built-up areas. This results 
in an inner urban limit value for ASIL D systems of 4.1∙10-10 
severe errors per kilometer. A comparison of this limit value 
and the values stated in Figure 5 shows that it is within the 
range in which the risks posed by automated vehicles are 
already no longer accepted by all stakeholders. If, as a 
consequence, it should become necessary in the future to prove 
sufficient safety, according to ASIL D, not only for individual 
components and/or (sub) systems, but also for entire vehicles, 
the complexity of the safety proof of automated driving is 
already apparent from this circumstance. However, due to 
dilution effects, the safety requirements will be lower during 
the introduction phase of automated vehicles due to lowered 
exposure, until a significant market share is reached. [cp. 5] 
V. CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of the present work was the 
definition of macroscopic safety requirements for automated 
driving within built-up areas.  
For the future market introduction of automated vehicles, 
the macroscopic risk is significantly influenced by (local) 
market penetration. The example of the automated DB shuttle 
buses in the Bavarian town of Bad Birnbach shows that the 
probability of encountering automated vehicles there and - as 
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a consequence - the risk of an accident is currently 
significantly higher. Nevertheless, this effect cannot be 
statistically recorded due to the absolute low number of events. 
Meanwhile, the risks of a traffic accident in the rest of 
Germany remain unaffected by the pilot project. [40] Since the 
marginal risks were determined within the framework of the 
present analysis based on reference values that result as 
average values from localities throughout the Federal Republic 
of Germany, their direct transferability to individual localities, 
in particular, is not yet given. Not least in order to establish the 
possibility of such a transfer, the influences of local market 
penetration on the inner-local risk acceptance are to be 
examined in further work. 
Furthermore, automated vehicles are not designed for 
exclusive distribution or exclusive use in only one country. 
Just as the macroscopic safety requirements in Germany can 
only be transferred to singular localities to a limited extent, 
their internationalization in the form of a comparison with 
reference values of today's urban traffic from countries other 
than the Federal Republic of Germany is also required. 
Additionally, the Federal Statistical Office distinguishes 
between three locations: urban areas, rural areas (excluding 
motorways) and motorways. For the latter, macroscopic safety 
requirements were defined by [5]. The inner urban counterpart 
was the subject of the present study. In order to cover all 
locations, macroscopic safety requirements for automated 
driving in rural areas have to be determined. Subsequently, it 
has to be discussed how the location-specific individual results 
could be combined. 
Regardless of the location under consideration, it must be 
considered that a hypothetical decrease in the number of 
accidents could result in lower tolerated limit risks and thus in 
higher safety requirements in the future. [5] Accordingly, 
macroscopic safety requirements must be continuously 
versioned and adapted to the current state of road safety. 
Even though all of the questions still open are potentially 
answered or dealt with in following research contributions, 
one aspect always needs to be taken into account when dealing 
with macroscopic safety requirements: There is no guarantee 
that risk limits that have been established will actually be 
accepted in individual cases. Despite this fact, it seems 
obligatory to deal with this topic as part of a comprehensive 
safety argumentation in order to enable the market 
introduction of automated driving functions at all. Hereby, the 
derived macroscopic safety requirements are not to be 
understood as design goals. Instead, they are intended to be 
used as reference values during safety approval. 
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